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Analytic papers concerning the content of olfactory experiences commonly start with a 
statement that olfaction has gained significantly less philosophical attention than vision. 
While it is certainly true, in recent years philosophers have formulated a significant number of 
alternative accounts of olfactory content. These positions share two characteristics. First, 
olfactory experiences are interpreted as representational (Batty 2009; Lycan 2014), i.e. they 
are not only “modifications of consciousness” but also represent the environment as being in a 
certain way. Second, olfactory experiences represent odours, like coffee odour or vanilla 
odour (e.g., Batty 2010b). Despite these two common assumptions, authors disagree how to 
properly characterise olfactory content. For example, it is claimed that olfaction represents 
odours instantiated by surrounding space (Batty 2010c), or instantiated by entities that are 
sources of odours (see Batty 2011; Lycan 2000; Mizrahi 2014 for a discussion), like an onion 
odour instantiated by an onion. On the other hand, it is postulated that odours are represented 
not as features of some entities, but rather as objects which themselves possess features and 
have mereological structure (Carvalho 2014, Young 2016). More generally, there seems to be 
an ontological controversy between two views: the first states that odours represented by 
olfaction should be characterised as features and the second states that they should be 
interpreted as objects. 
The above ontological controversy is a difficult one not only because of the internal 
complexity of the “olfactory content” debate, but also because in philosophical works there 
are various, competitive notions of what it means to be an object or a feature. In this paper, I 
aim to systematically address the “feature or object” status of odours represented by human 
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olfaction, starting from considerations about the visual content. We have a strong intuition 
that vision represents objects, for example a red square, possessing features like redness and 
squareness. What is more, a great deal of our intuitions regarding what it means to be an 
object or a feature is grounded in the way in which entities are visually represented. Hence 
objects and features represented by vision may be considered as paradigmatic examples of 
perceptually represented objects and features. Starting from this point one may analyse the 
characteristics that differentiate objects and features represented by vision. On this basis it 
may be then investigated whether the entities represented by olfaction possess characteristics 
that justify including them in the same ontological category as visually represented objects or 
features. This procedure also allows to reveals whether olfactorily represented odours are sui 
generis entities that differ significantly in their characteristics from visually represented ones.  
Such investigations constitute a first step in establishing whether various human 
modalities are ontologically unified by organising the environment according to the same 
categories. For example, perhaps all of them represent entities which, in virtue of sharing 
ontological characteristics, should be named ‘objects’. On the other hand, it is possible that 
human perceptual modalities are dis-unified, as they represent entities which possess 
significantly differing characteristics. 
The paper starts by explicating the notion of “perceptually represented entities” and 
specifying the type of perceptual experiences I am interested in (section 1). Later (section 2), I 
present three major types of ontological characteristics that will be used in investigating the 
ontology of entities represented by vision and olfaction. Subsequently, by using the types of 
characteristics identified, I compare visually and olfactorily represented objects by (I) 
investigating whether these entities are subjects or properties (section 3), (II) analysing their 
mereological structure (section 4), and (III) formulating their identity conditions (section 5). 
Relying on the results of this analysis (section 6), I argue that olfactorily represented odours 
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constitute a sui generis ontological category which differs from the categories of visually 
represented objects and features. However, odours and visually represented objects share an 
important characteristic: they are both primary subjects. 
 
1. Entities and Experiences 
 
Before starting to analyse the ontological characteristics of olfactorily and visually 
represented entities, it is important to clarify two methodological points. First, the entities I 
want to analyse, and second, the perceptual experiences that are relevant to my investigations. 
For the first point, perceptually represented entities should be distinguished from the 
entities that causally influence the perceptual system (see Young 2016 for a similar distinction 
in terms of “intentional” and “external” entities). In a typical olfactory experience, it may be 
represented that there is a vanilla odour in the surroundings, probably because there is a 
complex chemical mixture that influences olfactory receptors. One can also experience an 
olfactory hallucination when a vanilla odour is represented without the presence of a 
corresponding chemical mixture (see Mole 2010). In these examples the vanilla odour is a 
represented entity, while the chemical mixture is the causally influencing entity. It is 
important to notice that these entities may have differing ontological characteristics. For 
instance, the chemical mixture has a complex mereological structure composed of various 
molecules, but the represented vanilla odour is rather uniform.  
In this paper, I am interested in the ontological characteristics of perceptually 
represented entities and not external entities that causally influence perceptual mechanisms. In 
other words, I investigate the ontological description of the environment as it is presented 
through the senses. 
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The second methodological point concerns the perceptual experiences which I plan to 
investigate. The olfactory and visual experiences may be understood in two broad ways as (1) 
multimodal perceptual experiences or as (2) experiences combined with amodal beliefs that 
are only partially formed on the basis of perceptual experiences. For example, if I see a milk 
bottle, grab it and sniff to check whether the milk is spoiled, that is a multimodal experience 
with visual, tactile, and olfactory aspects. When I sense smoke I can form a belief, relying on 
a perceptual experience together with some additional knowledge, that my neighbour is 
making a barbecue; this would be an experience associated with a belief only partially formed 
on the basis of perceptual experiences.  
In this paper I do not investigate such broad experiences. The following analyses are 
restricted to unimodal olfactory and visual experiences with intuitive examples like “feeling a 
vanilla odour which is sweet and very intense” or “seeing a red square in the centre of visual 
field”. In the case of visual perception, I am concerned with relatively low-level features, like 
colours and shapes, as there is no agreement within the philosophy of perception about 
whether human vision represents kinds or causal relations (e.g., Bayne 2009). 
 
2. Ontological Characteristics 
 
Authors working in the field of analytic metaphysics distinguish various ontological 
categories of entities, like objects, properties (interpreted as universals or tropes), kinds, 
events, processes and relations, to name the most common ones. A criterion for enlisting an 
entity as an element of one of the ontological categories is whether this entity satisfy 
characteristics that are possessed by each member of this category. Within ontological 
discussions three types of such characteristics seem to be the most relevant. 
(1) Relations to other entities 
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Entities belonging to different ontological category have varying abilities to stand in 
relation to other entities. Probably the best known philosophical distinction of this kind is that 
between subjects and properties. It is often claimed that there is an asymmetry of instantiation 
between the entities characterised as subjects and entities characterised as properties: subjects 
instantiate properties but not vice versa (see Clark 2004a; Matthen 2004 for discussion in the 
context of vision)
1
. Using the classical example, it seems that Socrates is a subject 
instantiating a property of “being wise”, but “being wise” does not instantiate Socrates. As 
will be shown later, this distinction is of high relevance in discussions regarding olfactorily 
represented entities. 
(2) Internal structure 
Another type of characteristics that may differentiate entities of distinct categories 
concern their structure. Such characteristics may describe a mereological structure where the 
fundamental distinction divides atomic entities (i.e. which do not have any parts) from 
complex ones, or a topological structure which differentiates between entities that may exist 
while being spatially dispersed, and those which have to be topologically connected (Casati, 
Varzi 1999).  
(3) Identity conditions  
 The third type of characteristics describe identity conditions both in their synchronic 
and diachronic aspect. The synchronic identity conditions determine what is necessary and 
sufficient for an entity x existing at t1 and entity y also existing at t1 to be identical. 
Analogously, diachronic identity conditions characterise such rules for entities existing at 
different moments. An example of using identity conditions to differentiate between 
                                                          
1
 Later, I use the term „property” to name entities which, unlike subjects, are instantiated by something and the 
term „feature” to name entities such as colours and shapes. Because of that it cannot be automatically inferred 
that features are properties. 
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ontological categories comes from debates about the universal or particular status of 
properties: strict similarity is sufficient for synchronic identity of universals but not in the 
case of tropes (i.e. particular properties (Ehring 2011: 40-41)).  
In the subsequent sections I argue, referring to the above three types of characteristics, 
that visually represented objects and visually represented features belong to different 
ontological categories. Relying on this result, I determine whether olfactorily represented 
odours belong to the same category as visually represented objects or as visually represented 
features.  
In further examples a red square will serve as a paradigmatic object represented by 
vision, while a shade of red and squareness will be treated as paradigmatic visually 
represented features. I do not assume that vision represents only objects and features (and not, 
for instance, events). In addition, I accept that there may be visually represented entities that 
are commonly named ‘objects’ but in fact differ in ontological characteristics from 
paradigmatic objects like red squares so strongly that they should be interpreted as members 
of a different category. 
 
3. Relations to Other Entities: Subjects and Properties in Vision and Olfaction 
 
There is a strong intuition that a subject/property distinction differentiates between 
visually represented objects and visually represented features. It is a red square that posses a 
shade of red and squareness and not the other way round. However, less obvious is the source 
of this intuitive asymmetry. For instance, it is not an asymmetry of existential dependence: 
features represented by vision are always instantiated by something (an object, or sometimes a 
place (Clark 2004a)), and conversely, objects are not visually represented as featureless. In 
addition, it is not an asymmetry of uniqueness: a feature may be visually represented as 
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instantiated by many objects, for example we may perceive several objects of the same shade 
of red, but a single object is represented as having many features. 
I propose that the intuitive subject/property asymmetry in vision should be explicated 
by referring to the unificatory role of visually represented objects. It is widely accepted that 
human vision is able to resolve the so-called Many Properties Problem, i.e. it can distinguish 
between situations of perceiving different arrangements of the same elements (Clark 2004a). 
For example, a person can easily visually differentiate between a presentation of (1) a red 
square and a green triangle, and a presentation of (2) a red triangle and a green square. In both 
cases the represented elements are the same: two objects, redness, greenness, triangularity, 
and squareness, but they are combined differently. Hence many authors postulate that visual 
content cannot be characterised as a list of elements, as a single list would serve both of the 
above situations. On the contrary, content should be described in terms of objects connected 
with features through an instantiation-like relation (Clark 2004a; Cohen 2004; Keane 2008; 
Matthen 2004). 
While the Many Properties Problem is solved by combining objects with features, 
these two types of elements do not play the same role. In particular, there is an asymmetry of 
unification: a single object unifies many features into a perceptual unit, but a single feature 
does not unify many objects into such a unit. If redness and squareness are combined with the 
same object, then a red square is represented. It is a perceptual unit which is crucial for 
perceptual organisation of a visual scene on which further visual processes operates. In 
particular, a red square (1) can be easily attentively selected what allows for a detailed 
analysis of its features and spatial structure (Scholl 2001; Qiu and von der Heydt 2005), (2) 
can be tracked and re-identified despite its movement and changes in features (Pylyshyn 
2007; Scholl 2007), and (3) may be combined with other units to become a part of a larger 
whole (Xu and Singh 2002).  
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However, a feature does not usually create a perceptual unit from several objects. For 
example, if a red square is represented on the left side of the visual field and a green square on 
the right side, these two figures do not compose a single perceptual unit despite being both 
combined with squareness. First, it is much harder to simultaneously focus attention on two 
objects “unified” by a common feature than to focus attention on a unit composed of single 
objects and some features (as in case of a red square, Alvarez and Scholl 2005; Scholl et al. 
2001). Second, within a unit unified by a single object, the part-status of one component 
influences the part-status of other components. For instance, if a square shares an edge with a 
larger figure X, and so this edge is a part of X, then it is very likely that other edges of the 
square will also be recognised as parts of X (Palmer and Rock 1994). However, it is not the 
case with objects “unified” by a single features. Referring to our previous example, if we have 
two objects “unified” by squareness, then one of them may become a part of a larger figure X, 
but it is not likely to cause the other object to be also perceived as a part of X. Third, while it 
is very easy to track changes in a unit unified by a single object, it is much harder to do so 
when a task involves tracking several objects, even if they share some features. In such cases 
re-identification errors occur and changes in features are often difficult to notice (Pylyshyn 
2007: 37). 
Because of the above difference, the intuitive subject/property asymmetry between 
visually represented objects and visually represented features may be grounded in the 
unificatory role of objects in creating perceptual units. However, this postulate needs a further 
specification. First, it seems that visually represented features can also play an unificatory role 
for other features. For example, a particular shade of red unifies its features like those 
describing its brightness and saturation. Second, it is not universally true that features cannot 
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unify objects into perceptual units, since several nearby objects may be perceived as a single 
perceptual group if they share features such as colour or shape. Third, some philosophers of 
perception claim that at least in certain cases the unificatory role in solving the Many 
Properties Problem is served not by objects but by places (Clark 2004a). 
 Nevertheless, these observations do not undermine the special unificatory role of 
objects represented by vision. First, while features may unify other features into some type of 
perceptual units, they themselves, in order to solve the Many Properties Problem, must be 
unified into perceptual units by objects. This is not the case with objects that unify features 
without a need to be themselves unified into another perceptual unit. Second, while a feature 
like colour may unify objects into a perceptual group, such a grouping process operates on 
already formed perceptual units: figures in which features, with colour among them, are 
unified by objects. Third, while I argue that objects are subjects in relation to features, I do 
not claim that they are the only visually represented subjects. It is possible that there are also 
other entities, for instance places, with the characteristics of subjects. 
We may express the crucial difference by stating that objects are primary subjects as 
they create perceptual units without themselves being constituents of perceptual units unified 
by something else. On the other hand, features create perceptual units only by being 
constituents of units already unified by something else (mainly objects or places). Because of 
this asymmetry they may be characterised, when they constitute a perceptual unit together 
with objects, as properties of objects and, due to their limited unificatory abilities, 
characterised at most as secondary subjects. 
The above considerations show that visually represented objects have differing 
ontological characteristics, in terms of relations to other entities, to visually represented 
features. Now, we can ask whether odours represented by olfaction are, like visually 
represented objects, the primary subjects.  
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The first question that should be asked is whether olfaction, like vision, is able to solve 
the Many Properties Problem. Some authors claim that human olfaction has no ability to solve 
it, mainly due to the rudimentary spatial aspect of olfactory experiences. Probably the best-
known argument against olfactory abilities to solve the Many Properties Problem is the air 
freshener example provided by Clare Batty (2010a). Let’s imagine that someone tries to cover 
a cigarette odour with an air freshener odour and as a result has a perceptual experience in 
which two odours are represented. Visually, I can perceive two objects in many ways, for 
example the first object on the left of the second one, or vice versa, or one partially 
overlapping another. However, there seems to be no such variation in olfactory experiences; 
when we perceive cigarette and air freshener odours we do not discern between a situation in 
which the cigarette odour is to the right or left of an air freshener odour.  
While the above description may be accurate, it focuses too strongly on the contingent 
way in which the Many Properties Problem is solved by vision. The core ability to solve the 
Many Properties Problem lies in discriminating situations which contain varying 
arrangements of the same elements. Vision, due to its rich capability for spatial 
discrimination, may discern between situations where the same objects are situated in varying 
positions and it may be the case that olfaction, due to its limitations in representing space, 
cannot make analogous discriminations in the case of odours. However, it does not follow that 
there are no other cases of the Many Properties Problem in which olfaction can succeed (see 
Carvalho 2014 for a similar observation).  
In particular, olfaction does not only represent odours but also their various features, 
such as higher or lower intensities (Morton 2000), hedonic features (Castro and Seeley 2014), 
and trigeminal features such as irritating or cooling (Laska et al. 1997). Let’s consider a rather 
unfortunate case in which one experiences high-intensity cigarette odour and low-intensity 
onion odour both quite irritating. It is plausible that this situation can be olfactorily 
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distinguished from another in which the same elements are represented but the intensities are 
reversed: low-intensity cigarette odour and high-intensity onion odour both quite irritating. If 
such situations can be olfactorily distinguished, then as in standard descriptions of the Many 
Properties Problem, the olfactory content cannot be characterised as a list of elements: 
cigarette odour, onion odour, low-intensity, high-intensity, and irritating, because such a list 
applies to both situations. The content should be described in terms of odours-intensities-
trigeminal features combinations.  
Some authors believe (see Batty 2014) that the odour perception does not involve 
combining features with odours, rather odours are recognised as exemplars of categories and 
their features follow from this categorisation. For instance, if an odour is categorised as 
vanilla, then it follows that it has a feature of being sweet. However, the above example 
shows that this is not universally the case. In fact, the intensity-features seem to be 
particularly well suited to constructing olfactory examples of the Many Properties Problem. 
This is evidenced through cases of anosmia, where people can perceive intensities of odours 
without representing their qualitative character (Morton 2000). It suggests that the intensity-
features and qualitative-features of odours are represented separately and that the task of the 
perceptual system is to unify them within a more complex representation. Other plausible 
examples involve hedonic features that may change with experience and trigeminal features 
that are processed by a different physiological mechanism to the one that processes features 
like sweetness.  
Furthermore, the above example of solving the Many Properties Problem in olfaction 
reveals an asymmetry of unification between odours and other elements of olfactory content. 
A combination of an odour with features seems to form a perceptual unit and in both of the 
above situations two such units can be distinguished: one corresponding to the onion odour 
with its features and other to the cigarette odour with its features. This conviction is supported 
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by the fact that we are able to attentively chose each of the represented odours in order to 
analyse their features and structure (Gottfried 2010: 638). Further, we can track the selected 
odour despite changes in its features, for instance, as it becomes more or less intense 
(Richardson 2013). This suggests that odours, similar to visually represented objects, create 
perceptual units.  
However, the reverse does not hold. Onion and cigarette odours do not form a single 
perceptual unit unified by a trigeminal feature despite the fact that they are both irritating. 
Analogously for other olfactory features, the fact that two represented odours have a common 
feature of “being sweet” or “being unpleasant” does not seem to cause that they form a 
perceptual unit. This intuitive conviction is supported by the presence of figure/ground 
discrimination in olfaction. It is claimed that cases of representing two odours are situations in 
which one odour is discriminated against the background constituted by another odour (Batty 
2010a; Gottfried 2010; Young 2016). However, figure/ground discrimination phenomena 
occur not within one, but between two competing perceptual units. Hence one cannot 
simultaneously attentively select two odours “unified” by a common feature, since focusing 
on one odour causes the second odour to be perceived as an unattended ground. Analogously, 
tracking one odour to recognise changes in its features makes the second odour unattended 
and it is likely that changes in its features will not be registered. It suggests that when two 
odours are represented, then each one, together with its features, constitutes a separate 
perceptual unit.  
Taking into account the above observations, odours can be characterised as subject of 
features analogously to visually represented objects. However, one may doubt whether odours 
satisfy conditions for being primary subjects. Such a status of odours is controversial as some 
positions state that olfaction represents odours as instantiated by the space around us or by 
entities that are sources of odours (see Batty 2010c for discussion). This may justify a claim 
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that while odours bind features into perceptual units, they themselves are constituents of units 
unified by something else. 
I believe that the idea of “odours instantiated by space” is unjustified mainly because 
space around us does not usually unify olfactorily represented entities. If an entity is a subject 
of odours, then it should have an ability to be combined with more than one odour and, at 
least in usual circumstances, unify these odours into a perceptual unit. As stated earlier, 
human olfaction has limited abilities to make spatial discriminations. Olfactory experiences 
dispose us to actions, like sniffing to feel an odour more strongly or waving our hands in front 
of our face to reduce an unpleasant odour, which suggests that odours are represented with a 
spatial characteristic of being around us (Richardson 2013).  
However, unlike visual objects, odours are not represented with precise spatial 
localisation or spatial boundaries. Hence odours represented simultaneously often seem to 
have similar spatial characteristics, and in fact, according to positions which characterise 
odours as instantiated by places, they are assumed to be instantiated by a single place 
“somewhere around” (Batty 2010c). If such a place is interpreted as a subject of odours, then 
in a typical olfactory experience representing two odours, a single perceptual unit composed 
of both odours unified by a place is represented. However, this is not the case, since the 
presence of figure/ground discrimination phenomena shows that in typical olfactory 
experiences odours are treated as separate, competing units despite having the same 
localisation “somewhere around”. 
According to the second idea, the olfactory primary subjects are not odours but their 
sources. There is no consensus that olfaction represents sources, and philosophers have 
offered several arguments against this idea (e.g., Batty 2010b). First, the phenomenal 
character of unimodal olfactory experiences does not suggest that anything else beyond 
odours and their features are represented. Second, it is commonly the case that an odour is 
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perceived long after its source is gone. Because perceptual content is commonly understood 
as determining accuracy conditions of experiences (e.g., Siegel 2010), a perceptual experience 
representing the source of an odour would be inaccurate if the source was no longer present. 
However, it is implausible to interpret such cases as olfactory illusions. 
I believe that even if such arguments are unsuccessful and olfaction indeed represents 
the odours’ sources, there is still no justification for interpreting them as subjects of odours. In 
this case, in every olfactory experience, two types of elements are represented: an odour and a 
source. Olfaction can recognize the number of odours by processing input to olfactory 
receptors similarly to vision that can recognize the number of objects by processing 
information gathered on retinas. However, human olfaction cannot recognize the number of 
sources independently from recognizing the number of odours as there is no causal influence 
from a source, let’s say an onion, to an olfactory system apart from detecting certain chemical 
compounds in the surrounding space. It is rather the case that the number of sources is 
inferred from the represented number of odours.  
From this perspective, let’s consider two situations: (1) two separate perceptual units 
are represented: a chocolate odour and an orange odour, and (2) where one perceptual unit is 
represented: a complex chocolate-orange odour formed by unifying separate odours from 
situation (1). If sources are the subjects of odours, then in (1) there should be two represented 
sources, but only one source in (2). However, because olfaction represents the number of 
sources by inferring from the represented number of odours, sources do not unify perceptual 
units, but are attributed to already recognised perceptual units. In situation (1), two perceptual 
units are represented and the presence of two sources is inferred. In contrast, in situation (2), 
two simple odours are unified into one complex perceptual unit, probably due to an activation 
of a previously learned chocolate-orange odour category (Batty 2014; Wilson and Stevenson 
2003), and as an effect a single source is represented. In this interpretation, while sources are 
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represented and their number corresponds to the number of represented odours, they do not 
play any unificatory role. 
The above considerations show that olfactorily represented odours are primary 
subjects just like objects that are represented by vision. This supports a hypothesis that odours 
should be interpreted as belonging to the same category as visually represented objects and 
not as visually represented features. In the next sections, I judge whether this verdict is also 
supported by considerations regarding the internal structure and identity condition of odours.  
 
4. Internal Structure: Mereology of Vision and Olfaction 
 
In the previous section, I have expressed an intuition that visually represented objects 
seem to be subjects of features represented by vision. The second, equally strong intuition is 
that visually represented objects not only possess features but also have parts.  
Simple visually represented objects may become parts of more complex ones, 
particularly when they are spatially connected (Palmer and Rock 1994). For example, it is 
likely that when two squares connected by sides, one red and one green, are represented, then 
a more complex, rectangular figure composed of these two squares is also represented. 
Components of this figure have features that differ from the whole: they differ in shape, size, 
and colour as they are wholly green or wholly red which is not the case in the complex figure. 
Furthermore, simpler objects still maintain their status of two separate objects after being 
combined into a more complex entity. In the above example we can focus attention on each of 
the two squares or track changes in their features independently of one another. Generally 
speaking, there exist complex visually represented objects, whose components are simpler 
visually represented objects having differing features to the whole they compose. 
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Considering above observations we may ask whether visually represented features also 
have parts. Specifically, we may ask whether visually represented features can have feature-
components with characteristics distinct from those of a whole they compose.  
If we choose a shade of red as a paradigmatic example of a visually represented 
feature, then it seems that the above hypothesis is false. Within a shade of red we are unable 
to distinguish feature-components that have different characteristics, like hue, brightness, or 
saturation, to the considered colour. Furthermore, there is no visual process which combines 
two colours into another, more complex colour in which the initial, simpler colours can still 
be distinguished as separate elements maintaining their characteristics from before the 
combining. For example, combining a shade of red with a shade of yellow will produce a 
shade of orange which has characteristics that makes it similar both to redness and 
yellowness, but these colours are not perceived as two separate components of orange. 
On the other hand, the result will probably be different if one takes squareness as an 
example of a visually represented feature. The feature of squareness seems to be composed of 
several other features, for instance describing orientation of edges or angles at which edges 
meet. One of these orientation-features may be “verticality” or “horizontality” but the 
squareness itself is not horizontal or vertical. In addition, shape-features may be visually 
combined into more complex shapes while still maintaining their status as separate entities. 
For instance, by combining squareness with triangularity a house-like shape can be obtained. 
In such a shape its square component and triangular component can still be easily 
distinguished, and have different characteristics to the house-like whole (like “having four 
edges” and “having three edges” in contrast to “having six edges” as displayed by the whole 
shape).  
So the category of visually represented features is not uniform in respect of internal 
structure. There are types of features (e.g., shape) that, like visually represented objects, can 
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be combined into a whole, while preserving their status of separate entities. However, some 
types of features (e.g., colour) cannot be combined into part-discernible wholes. Considering 
these observations we may ask whether odours are mereologically more like objects or 
features represented by vision. 
It is commonly claimed that olfactory perception is more ‘synthetic’ than ‘analytic’ 
(e.g., Barwich 2014; Wilson and Stevenson 2003), meaning that olfactory experiences do not 
reflect the complexity of chemical mixtures influencing the olfactory receptors, but represent 
homogenous odours. An example from psychological literature is the lemon odour which does 
not seem to have any internal structure. However, some odours, like the one arising from 
being presented with pyridine and lavender mixture (both examples from Lawless 1997: 141-
142), seem to be composed of two odours, each with individual features (e.g., one component 
may be more sweet or pleasant than the whole). Therefore one may suppose that odours are 
mereologically more like visually represented features than visually represented objects. In 
respect of their internal structure the category of odours in not uniform. It seems that some 
combinations of odours result in representing a new uniform odour (like in case of a visual 
mixture of yellow and red), and other combinations result in a complex odour with the initial 
odours as parts (analogous to combining squareness and triangularity into a house-like shape). 
However, the mereology of odours has some peculiar features which suggest that the 
their internal structure is significantly different from the structures of both objects and 
features that are represented by vision. The empirical investigations show that while people 
can perceive some odours as having odour-components with features different to the whole 
complex odour, this ability is limited in the number of odour-parts that can be distinguished. 
For instance (Jinks and Liang 1999; Laing and Francis 1989; Livermore and Liang 1998), 
when a complex odour composed of several simpler ones (like strawberry, lavender, honey 
etc.) is represented, 90% of participants can distinguish no more than four of its odour-parts. 
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These components have different features to the whole complex odour in the same analogue 
way that red and green squares have different features to the rectangle they compose. For 
instance, a red square is wholly red, and that is not true about the rectangle. Similarly, a honey 
component of a complex odour is wholly honey-like, which is not true about the complex 
odour.  
Particularly interesting, is that such odour-parts do not seem to exhaust the qualitative 
character of the complex odour. For instance (Laing and Francis 1989: 813), people perceive 
that the qualitative character of a multi-component odour is not reducible to the combination 
of its three or four odour-parts that a person can distinguish. Using the synthetic/analytic 
opposition, it can be stated that complex odours are analysed as having several parts but they 
are also synthetic wholes which cannot be reduced to the combination of their parts. This has 
important consequences for olfactory mereology.  
Classical mereological conceptions characterize parthood-relation as reflexive, 
antisymmetric, and transitive. What is more, they accept two common-sense rules knows as 
weak supplementation principle and strong supplementation principle (Casati and Varzi 1999: 
38-39). In intuitive terms, weak supplementation principle states than an entity cannot have 
only one proper part, i.e. a part that is not identical with the whole object
2
. According to the 
strong supplementation principle, if an entity x is not a part of entity y, then x has not exactly 
the same parts as y
3
. These supplementation principles seem to be satisfied by visually 
represented objects and those visually represented features that can be plausibly described as 
having parts. In fact, it seems even senseless to speak about objects represented by vision that 
have only one proper part, like a red square whose only proper part would be its bottom edge, 
                                                          
2
 More precisely: if x is a proper part of y, then there is z such that z is a part of y and z does not have any 
common part with x. 
3
 More precisely: if y is not a part of x, then there is z such that z is a part of y and z does not have any common 
part with x. 
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or a complex feature like house-shape whose only part would be triangularity. Similarly, if a 
visually represented object or a shape-feature is not a part of another object or feature, then 
the part-structure of these objects or features has to be distinct. For instance, it seems 
impossible to visually represent a spatially separated red square and a green square having 
exactly the same edges.  
On the other hand, it is likely that the mereology of odours is non-classical as it does 
not satisfy any of the supplementation principles. Sometimes a person can identify only one 
odour-component of a complex odour (Livermore and Liang 1998: 655). In such a case 
olfaction represents an odour which has exactly one part, which is a proper one as it is not 
identical to the whole odour. For instance, a person may be able to distinguish only a honey-
component in a mixture composed of several odorants while this mixture is not perceived as 
identical to the honey-odour. This result falsifies weak supplementation principle by showing 
the possibility of odours having only one proper part
4
.  
Further, because distinguished odour-components do not exhaust the qualitative 
character of a complex odour, it seems possible to represent two odours, neither of which is a 
part of another, as having exactly the same parts. For instance, let’s assume that there are four 
chemicals, numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, that give rise to experiences of simple, partless odours. 
Combining these chemicals leads to experiences of complex odours in which some odour-
parts can be distinguished. However, as shown in empirical studies (Livermore and Liang 
1998), in some cases a person can distinguish less than four odour-components while 
representing a complex odour. Therefore we cannot refute the possibility of a person being 
presented with both mixtures {1, 2, 3} and {1, 2, 4} but being able to distinguish only odour-
components corresponding to chemical 1 and 2 regardless of whether she focuses on 
                                                          
4
 In fact, it also falsifies the strong supplementation principle as the weak supplementation principle is entailed 
by the strong one (Casati and Varzi 1999: 38-39). 
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combination {1, 2, 3} or {1, 2, 4}. Nevertheless, the joint presentation of {1, 2, 3} and {1, 2, 4} 
gives rise to the experience of two qualitatively different odours, reflecting a difference in 
their chemical composition. This possibility is inconsistent with the strong supplementation 
principle as olfaction simultaneously represents two distinct odours which both have the same 
parts. 
The above observations suggest that the internal structure of odours represented by 
human olfaction is significantly different from that of visually represented objects and 
features. While objects and features represented by vision satisfy the basic principles of 
classical mereology, this is not the case with odours, whose mereology is not a classical one, 
since it does not satisfy the supplementation principles. 
 
5. Identity Conditions: Essential Characteristics and Continuity 
 
The investigations concerning the identity conditions have two aspects. First, is the 
question of the synchronic identity condition which is answered by providing an identity 
criterion for entities that exist at the same moment. Second, is the question of the diachronic 
identity conditions which, by analogy, can be answered by specifying an identity criterion for 
entities existing at different moments. Below, I begin by discussing synchronic, and then 
diachronic identity conditions for visually represented objects and features as well as for 
olfactorily represented odours. 
 
5.1 Synchronic identity 
 
Human vision can represent several objects that share features. For instance, one may 
simultaneously perceive two red squares of the same size, so a synchronic identity criterion 
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for visually represented objects cannot be formulated in terms of having the same colour, size, 
shape etc. However, it seems that two squares cannot be represented as having the same 
localisation, as a representation of such a perfect overlap would not be visually different from 
a representation of a single square.  
Nevertheless, some authors doubt that two objects located at the same place cannot be 
visually represented. The provided examples include semi-transparent, overlapping gabor-
patches (Pylyshyn 2007: 40-42), colourful mists that mix with each other (Cohen 2004), or 
moving objects whose trajectories intersect, so that are momentarily at exactly at the same 
place (like in well-known ambiguous streaming/bouncing stimuli, Sekuler and Sekuler 1999). 
On the other hand, there are reasons to believe that such examples do not constitute genuine 
cases of representing two objects at exactly same location (Clark 2004b), as they may be 
described in terms of objects whose locations partially overlap or which are positioned in the 
same direction but at differing distances from the observer.  
However, if there are indeed cases in which two objects are represented as being at the 
same place, then a different characterisation of objects’ synchronic identity conditions has to 
be adopted. In this case it is possible to visually represent two objects sharing both features 
describing location, and those describing visual qualities like colour or shape. In order to 
properly formulate a synchronic identity criterion for visually represented objects it has to be 
postulated, as in philosophical theories of “thisness” (see Adams 1979), special identifying 
features whose only function is to individuate objects. According to this view, vision 
represents objects not only as having locations, colour, shapes, etc., but also as having a 
feature similar to “being the object A” or “being the object B” (numerically different from A). 
In fact, some psychological theories postulate mechanisms, like visual indices or object-files 
(Kahneman et al. 1992; Pylyshyn 2007), whose function is to individuate objects without 
representing their qualitative features. 
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I do not attempt to resolve the above controversy. It is more important in the context 
of this paper that both the above positions share an important property. According to the first 
position, having the same location is the necessary and sufficient identity condition for the 
objects represented by vision. The proponents of the second position believe that sharing the 
location is not sufficient for identity; visually represented objects are identical if and only if 
they have the same identifying feature. Therefore we can state that according to both of the 
above theories visually represented objects are synchronically individuated by a unitary 
individuator, because there is a single feature whose sameness constitutes the synchronic 
identity criterion. I believe that no characteristic has such a distinguished individuatory role in 
the case of visually represented features.  
A visually represented feature like a shade of colour has characteristics describing its 
hue, brightness, and saturation. Sharing some of these characteristics is not enough for 
visually represented features to be identical, as they may be shared by multiple colours, for 
instance by a shade of red and a shade of green with the same brightness. However, sharing 
all of these characteristics seems to constitute a necessary and sufficient condition for 
synchronic identity. If we are comparing a colour-feature F and a colour-feature G, then F and 
G would be the same feature if hue, brightness, and saturation were all the same in both 
colour features. The same is true about shape-features like squareness. Sharing a single 
characteristic, for example describing the number of edges or connections between them, does 
not guarantee that one shape is the same as another, but sharing all such characteristics seems 
to entail synchronic identity. 
In addition, having the same localisation is not sufficient for the synchronic identity of 
visually represented features, since two features can be represented as being in the same 
place, for example a colour and a texture. Minimally, to formulate a proper synchronic 
identity criterion, two characteristics have to be taken into account: localisation and a 
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characteristic specifying the feature-type. For instance, vision does not represent two colour-
type features, like a shade of green and a shade of red, at exactly the same place.  
It seems that there are two approaches to characterising synchronic identity conditions 
of visually represented features. The first relies on the identity of all qualitative characteristics 
and the second is based on the identity of the location plus a characteristic describing the 
feature-type. However, none of these approaches characterises visually represented features as 
having a unitary individuator as there is no single characteristic whose sameness solely 
constitutes the synchronic identity criterion of features. 
Below, I argue that the synchronic identity conditions of odours represented by human 
olfaction have the same general properties as the synchronic identity conditions of visually 
represented features, i.e. odours do not have unitary individuators.  
In the previous sections, I pointed out that olfaction represents various types of 
features, such as the intensity-features, trigeminal-features, hedonic-features, or qualitative 
features like sweetness. However, it seems that there is no single feature that guarantees the 
identity of odours. For instance, one may perceive two sweet odours, two irritating odours, or 
two odours of the similar intensity. In addition, the sameness of location is not sufficient for 
the identity of odours, because due to the limited abilities of olfactory representations of 
space, the common case is that two odours are represented in the same general place, i.e. 
“around us” (Batty 2010c). On the other hand, it would be too strong to postulate that the 
synchronic identity of odours demands the sameness of all features. For example, it is not 
likely that odours can be perceived as distinct while differing only in their intensity. 
Such intuitive observations suggest that the synchronic identity criterion of odours 
should be formulated in terms of similarity, where higher similarity is correlated with a higher 
number of shared features. In fact, while the number of odours that the human olfaction can 
distinguish is a matter of debate, it is established that there is a correlation between the 
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overlap of compounds in chemical mixtures and the ability to cause indistinguishable 
olfactory experiences (Gerkin and Castro 2015; Bushdid et al. 2014). This suggests that the 
synchronic identity conditions of odours are connected with the similarity of their features, 
because similarity in the composition of chemical mixtures is likely to be correlated with the 
ability to cause perception of similar olfactory features. In this case an odour O1 is identical to 
an odour O2 if and only if O1 shares a sufficient number of features with O2, where 
‘sufficient’ is a matter of detailed empirical investigations. In other words, there are no cases 
in which two odours are simultaneously represented while exceeding some level of similarity. 
Given such a similarity-based criterion, odours cannot be characterised as having a unitary 
individuator as they are not individuated by a single element but by sharing a certain number 
of features.  
 
5.2 Diachronic identity 
 
The topic of how human vision represents the diachronic identity of objects is well 
investigated within cognitive psychology. The main research paradigms are (1) Multiple 
Object Tracking in which participants track and re-identify several moving target-objects 
among distractors (see Pylyshyn 2007) and (2) Object-Specific Preview Benefit where the 
task is to recognise whether one of the objects presented later has the same feature as an 
object presented earlier (see Kahneman et al. 1992). The theoretical assumption behind these 
paradigms is that factors which make the re-identification of objects harder or which make the 
time needed to find the common feature of objects longer, are likely to break the represented 
diachronic identity. Measuring rates of errors and reaction times, rather than participants’ 
verbal reports about perceived identities, allows the investigation of how sameness is 
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established by a low-level, perceptual mechanism without the changes introduced by higher-
level beliefs.  
The psychological investigations resulted in a widely held consensus that vision 
represents objects as being diachronically the same, as long as they move in a 
spatiotemporally continuous fashion and maintain spatial coherence (Scholl 2007). This 
means that diachronic identity stops being visually represented when objects, inter alia, do 
not move continuously but “jump” between places, or disappear for a long period of time5. 
Similarly, diachronic identity breaks when objects undergo topological changes like dividing 
into fragments or even if a hole is added to an object, as such changes disrupt spatial cohesion 
(van Marle and Scholl 2003; Zhou et al. 2010). Changes, for example in colour or topology-
preserving shape changes, are claimed to be contingent for diachronic sameness (Pylyshyn 
2007: 37).  
The scientific results suggest that the diachronic identity criterion for visually 
represented objects should be formulated both in terms of some of the object’s features and a 
relation of spatiotemporal continuity. There are topology-related features, whose change leads 
to the object after the change not being represented the same as the object before the change, 
but there are also changes in features which do not break identity. Using classical 
metaphysical terminology, we can name these features essential and contingent respectively. 
However, sharing essential features is not sufficient for objects to be diachronically identical 
as they also have to stand in a spatiotemporal continuity relation. So we can state that an 
object x is diachronically identical to an object y if and only if x has the same essential 
features as y and x is continuous with y.  
                                                          
5
 The only exceptions are cases of brief occlusion where the contours of an object are gradually deleted and then 
gradually reappear. Such deviations from spatiotemporal continuity do not break the sameness of objects (Scholl 
2007) 
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The division between essential and contingent features seems to be also applicable to 
visually represented features. For instance, colours represented in subsequent moments are not 
recognised as being the same if they differ in hue. However, a feature is recognised as the 
same even if it changes its localisation through time. What differentiates visually represented 
objects and visually represented features in regard of diachronic identity is the role of 
continuity relations.  
The disturbances of continuity are likely to break the diachronic identity between 
objects but this is not the case for visually represented features. Let’s consider a situation in 
which one perceives a square object at place P1 which is then suddenly replaced by a 
triangular object at place P2, which in turn is replaced by a square object at place P3. I believe 
that there is a strong intuition that the shape of the earliest object will be recognised as the 
same as the shape of the last object. This is the case despite the lack temporal continuity as 
there is a gap between the presentation of the first and the second square object, a lack of 
spatial continuity since objects appear in disjointed places, and a lack of ‘qualitative 
continuity’ as shapes of objects do not change gradually. Therefore a diachronic identity 
criterion for visually represented features may be formulated solely in terms of essential 
features, without a reference to continuity relations. 
Analogously as in case of synchronic individuation, diachronic identity conditions of 
odours seem to be more like those of visually represented features than visually represented 
objects. Within features possessed by odours represented by human olfaction we can also 
draw a distinction between essential and contingent ones. For instance, we can track an odour 
and recognise it as being the same despite changes in its intensity (Richardson 2013). 
However, categorisation-features of odours are essential. If at one time an odour categorised 
as coffee is represented and at a subsequent moment an odour categorised as vanilla is 
represented, then these odours will not be recognised as diachronically identical.  
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The presence of a distinction between contingent and essential characteristics is 
applicable to odours, visually represented objects, and to visually represented features. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the continuity relations are far less important for formulating a 
diachronic identity criterion for odours than is the case where objects represented by vision 
are concerned. Similarly, as in the case of visually represented features, one can easily 
imagine a situation of first being presented with a coffee odour which then suddenly 
disappears and after an odourless period a coffee odour with the same features is presented 
again. As in the case of visually represented features, such a situation is likely to be 
recognised as two occurrences of the same odour despite a lack of temporal and qualitative 
continuity.  
In fact, the difference between the importance of continuity in vision and olfaction is 
well justified by differences in the properties of entities that cause visual and olfactory 
experiences. Human vision is suited to tracking solid objects with quite well-defined 
boundaries which move along continuous trajectories. Conversely, olfaction reacts to 
chemical combinations whose boundaries are vague, can easily mix with other combinations, 
and may change their condensation in rather unpredictable ways due to various environmental 
factors. In such circumstances, particularly given the very limited abilities of human olfaction 
to represent space, it is more reliable to re-identify odours referring to their features than to 
patterns of continuity relations. 
 
6. Objects, features, and odours 
 
The above investigations clearly show that visually represented objects and visually 
represented features differ significantly in their ontological characteristics and can be 
plausibly treated as belonging to different categories of entities. Objects represented by 
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human vision: (1) are primary subjects, (2) at least some of them are complex objects having 
parts, (3) have unitary synchronic individuators, and (4) not only essential characteristics but 
also continuity relations are crucial for their diachronic identity. Conversely, concerning 
visually represented features: (1) they are at most secondary subjects, (2) there are feature-
types to which only partless features belong, (3) they are synchronically individuated by 
combinations of characteristics, and (4) the diachronic identity condition of features can be 
formulated solely in terms of essential characteristics without invoking the notion of 
continuity. 
It is also not difficult to notice that olfactorily represented odours cannot be easily 
interpreted as belonging to the same category as visually represented objects or visually 
represented features. Odours (1) are primary subjects just as visually represented objects, (2) 
they posses non-classical mereological structure what significantly differs them from both 
visually represented objects and features, (3) just like visually represented features, they do 
not have unique individuators and (4) their diachronic identity criterion can be formulated 
without ascribing a significant role to continuity relations. To sum up, odours share the status 
of subjects with visually represented objects, but are individuated in a way similar to that of 
visually represented features, and have original, non-classical mereology. 
Given the above results it is not surprising that there is an ongoing controversy about 
interpreting olfactorily represented odours as objects or as features. They share some, but not 
all, characteristics with paradigmatic perceptually represented entities, i.e. objects and 
features represented by vision. Therefore one should postulate that odours represented by 
human olfaction constitute a third ontological category which is different both from the 
category of visually represented objects and from the category of visually represented 
features. In this sense, human vision and human olfaction are dis-unified as they represent 
entities with significantly differing ontological characteristics. 
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However, this disunity is not complete. In particular, both vision and olfaction 
represent entities that allow for forming perceptual units by being primary subjects. It is worth 
noting that these common ontological characteristics of visually represented objects and 
olfactorily represented odours are achieved despite the fact that only vision has an extensive 
ability to represent space. 
The above results pose a question concerning the ontological unity of all human 
perceptual modalities. Further investigations may reveal that entities represented by other 
senses, like auditorily represented sounds, gustatorily represented flavours, or tactilely 
represented objects, should also be characterised as primary subjects. Furthermore, one can 
also investigate whether, and to what extent, vision or olfaction are ontologically unique in 
relation to other human perceptual modalities. For instance, one may ask if the classical 
mereology of vision is a standard among senses or constitutes an exception, since the 
mereology of entities represented by other modalities is more like the mereology of odours. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of ontological characteristics possessed by olfactorily represented odours 
shows that that they constitute a different category of entities to objects and features 
represented by vision. This suggests that in the debate concerning object or feature status of 
odours both alternatives are false as odours differ significantly from paradigmatic, visually 
represented features and objects. However, the ontologies of human vision and human 
olfaction are not completely different as both these modalities represent entities that are 
primary subjects. The question for further investigations is whether this common aspect 
ontologically unifies all human senses. 
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